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Abstract
Paying particular attention to the degree of banking market concentration in devel-
oping countries, this paper examines the e↵ect of credit information sharing on bank
lending. Using bank-level data from African countries over the period 2004 to 2009
and a dynamic two-step system generalised method of moments (GMM) estimation,
it is found that credit information sharing increases bank lending. The degree of
banking market concentration moderates the e↵ect of credit information sharing on
bank lending. The results are robust to controlling for possible interactions between
credit information sharing and governance.
JEL classification: D82; G21; G28; L13.
Keywords: Information sharing; Banking market concentration; Bank lending;
Governance.
1. Introduction
Information asymmetry and poor contract enforcement lead to suboptimal credit
market equilibrium (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981). To the extent that these problems
are endemic in underdeveloped countries, financial sector underdevelopment in these
countries could be attributed to poor credit information about borrowers. Credit
information sharing is therefore expected to facilitate lending decisions (Bennardo
⇤Tel.: +44 1902 32 1774
Email address: S.Fosu@wlv.ac.uk; sfoso00@gmail.com (Samuel Fosu)
et al., 2010; Pagano & Jappelli, 1993), reduce loan default by increasing borrowers’
incentive to repay (Padilla & Pagano, 1997, 2000), and increase competition which in
turn leads to higher lending (Pagano & Jappelli, 1993). The benefits of information
sharing are hypothesised to be particularly helpful in less consolidated or more com-
petitive banking markets, where borrower credit information is dispersed (Marquez,
2002). Although recent empirical interest has been drawn to the potential benefits
of credit information sharing on lending decisions, the moderating e↵ect of banking
sector consolidation has been largely ignored.
In this paper I examine the e↵ect of credit information sharing on bank lending
in African countries. I further condition this e↵ect on the extent of banking sector
consolidation. This paper focuses on African countries for a number of reasons.
The region exhibits record high levels of default. This, coupled with inadequate
credit information and poor creditor rights protection, makes lending decisions within
African banking markets a di cult task. Unsurprisingly, therefore, African banking
markets remain dramatically underdeveloped, even compared to other developing
countries (Honohan & Beck, 2007; Mylenko, 2007). Bank credit to the private sector
in the region lags behind that of other regions. The region records the lowest credit
penetration in the world (Mylenko, 2007) with less than 20% of households having
access to formal banking services (Beck et al., 2009).
A key feature to which Africa’s financial sector under-development may be at-
tributed is weak contract enforcement. With rule of law, regulatory quality, and
control of corruption well below the world average, it is unsurprising that it takes an
extremely lengthy process to recover bad loans (Sacerdoti, 2005). The high credit
risk translates into high interest spreads and margins (Beck et al., 2009).
With low banking depth and breadth, as well as high credit risk, the potential
benefits of credit information have been appreciated in a few African countries. A
few years ago, public credit registries and private credit bureaus were virtually non-
existent. In recent times, significant e↵orts have been made to have operational
information sharing systems in a number of African countries. In many of these
countries, however, information sharing systems are in their infancy (e.g., Zambia,
Nigeria and Ethiopia) and have low coverage. Several other countries are also in the
process of establishing operational credit information sharing (e.g., Ghana, Tanzania
and Uganda).
The e↵ort to establish functional credit information sharing schemes in Africa is
consistent with several years of financial sector reforms that have promoted banking
competition in the region. With significant reforms across the African financial
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sectors over the past two decades,1 the region has witnessed significant financial
deepening and broadening in recent times (see Allen et al., 2012; Beck et al., 2009).
Compared to developing countries in other regions, however, the pace of improvement
is much slower (Allen et al., 2012). The years of reforms have also led to a downward
trend in banking sector concentration, which has been characteristically high for the
region (Fosu, 2013). Whilst the downward trend in concentration does not necessarily
indicate improved competition (Boone et al., 2005, 2007; Boone, 2008; Demsetz,
1973), it does suggest that credit information is becoming more dispersed as the
pool of borrowers per bank becomes smaller (Marquez, 2002).
In view of the above-mentioned features, this paper seeks to answer the following
questions: first, how does credit information sharing a↵ect lending in developing
countries? Second, to what extent does the depth (or the characteristics) of credit
information a↵ect lending decisions? Third, to what extent is the e↵ect of credit
information sharing conditional on the degree of banking market concentration?
The results suggest that credit information sharing improves bank lending. It is
also found that the depth of credit information is similarly important in increasing
bank lending. Furthermore, it is found that the e↵ect of credit information sharing is
higher in less concentrated banking markets. The findings are robust to controlling
for several measures of institutional quality and their possible interactions with credit
information.
The paper contributes to the existing literature in several ways: first, the paper
provides the first bank-level (supply side) evidence of the e↵ect of credit informa-
tion on credit allocation. Bank-level data ensures that individual banks’ reactions
to credit information sharing are not confounded by aggregate variation in credit
allocation. In particular, bank-level data helps to isolate variations in credit alloca-
tion arising from (unobserved) heterogeneity of banks. Using aggregated credit data
makes it impossible to isolate lending behaviour of specialised banks, especially those
that are there to serve government motives. Second, this paper is the first to provide
empirical evidence about the moderating e↵ect of banking sector consolidation on
the benefits of credit information sharing. Third, the paper further investigates the
extent to which a wider range of institutional factors interacts with credit informa-
tion sharing to impact on credit allocation. Finally, this is the first paper to attempt
a comprehensive study of credit information sharing and bank lending in African
countries.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a review of
1Financial sector reforms are in the form of interest rate liberalisation, removal of credit ceilings,
and privatisation of financial institutions, among others (see Allen et al., 2012).
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the theoretical literature and empirical evidence that motivates this study. Section
3 outlines the research hypotheses. The data and variables used for the study are
described in Section 5, whilst the empirical estimation methods are provided in
Section 4. The findings of the study are discussed in Section 6. Section 7 concludes
the study.
2. Literature review
This section provides a review of the theoretical and empirical literature that
motivates this study. A strand of literature motivating the relationship between
credit information sharing and credit market outcome (e.g., Behr & Sonnekalb, 2012;
Bennardo et al., 2010; Brown et al., 2009; Djankov et al., 2007; Love & Mylenko, 2003;
Padilla & Pagano, 1997, 2000; Pagano & Jappelli, 1993) is reviewed first. This is then
followed by a body of literature that suggests that banking market concentration or
competition is of importance in the relationship between credit information sharing
and bank lending decisions (e.g., Cetorelli & Peretto, 2000; Jappelli & Pagano, 2002;
Marquez, 2002; Pagano & Jappelli, 1993; Petersen & Rajan, 1995).
2.1. Theory of credit information sharing and bank lending
Theory shows that credit information sharing impacts on credit market perfor-
mance by reducing adverse selection in lending (Pagano & Jappelli, 1993), reducing
moral hazard on the part of borrowers, thereby increasing borrower e↵orts (Padilla
& Pagano, 1997, 2000), and reducing credit rationing in multiple bank lending (Ben-
nardo et al., 2010).
Pagano & Jappelli (1993) show that credit information sharing reduces adverse
selection in bank lending. In their model, credit information sharing helps increase
the bankable population and possibly expand lending. In the absence of credit infor-
mation, banks cannot distinguish between new pools of potential borrowers who are
likely to repay and those who are likely to default. The authors show that in such
a situation, since the new loan applicants might have borrowed from other banks in
the past, information sharing can help the bank in question make the right decision
to lend safely to credible new applicants. The overall impact on lending, however,
depends on the extent to which increased lending to safe borrowers compensates for
the reduced lending to risky borrowers. As information sharing also reduces infor-
mational rent in contestable banking markets, the resulting increase in competition
can increase lending.
Information sharing may also induce more bank lending by reducing borrower
hold-up problems. Credit information acquired by a bank today confers informa-
tional advantage, which permits it to extract higher interest rates from borrowers
4
in the future. Padilla & Pagano (1997) show that, when banks commit to sharing
credit information, the extraction of informational rent is restrained. This increases
borrower e↵ort and makes repayment more likely. With reduced default risk, interest
rates decrease and lending, in turn, increases.
It is also argued that sharing default information may serve as a disciplinary
device to encourage borrowers to repay their debt. Among other moral hazard
situations, borrowers may prioritise potential returns from risky investments over
incentives to repay (Myers, 1977). It is shown in Klein (1992), Vercammen (1995)
and Padilla & Pagano (2000) that sharing default information encourages repay-
ment. This is because sharing credit information allows borrowers who default to
be blacklisted. As blacklisted borrowers may have di culty getting credit in fu-
ture, borrowers thus have an incentive to avoid default. The resulting reduction in
default rates could reduce borrowing cost and increase lending. Padilla & Pagano
(2000), however, argue that sharing only default information has the potential to
increase lending; sharing information about borrower quality cannot increase lend-
ing since borrowing cost cannot be reduced any further due to the elimination of
informational rent.
Moreover, credit information sharing may help reduce over-borrowing and its
associated credit rationing in multiple bank lending (Bennardo et al., 2010). Aside
from the higher implicit cost in multiple bank lending (Petersen & Rajan, 1994),
borrowing from multiple banks induces opportunistic behaviour among borrowers,
causing them to over-borrow. This behaviour can be costly to lenders. Hence, their
natural response to this opportunistic behaviour is to ration credit, raise interest
rates or deny credit. Bennardo et al. (2010) show that credit information sharing
permits lenders to assess the outstanding debts of each borrower and lend safely.
This mitigates the need for credit rationing and higher interest charges. Therefore,
bank lending is expected to be higher in the presence of credit information sharing.
The above review shows that credit information can have a positive e↵ect on bank
lending, although borrower composition (Pagano & Jappelli, 1993) and the type of
information shared (Padilla & Pagano, 2000) may also have a role to play. In the
following sections, the literature that links the banking market concentration to the
relationship is reviewed.
2.1.1. Interaction of competition and credit information sharing
Theory explains that, by reducing adverse selection, borrower hold-up problems
and moral hazard, credit information sharing may help reduce default rate and in-
crease lending. However, there is a strand of literature that suggests that the over-
all impact of credit information sharing depends to some extent on the degree of
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banking market concentration. This literature further suggests that banking market
concentration may not always restrain access to credit in informationally asymmetric
banking markets.
Literature on banking competition suggests that imperfect competition is asso-
ciated with higher interest rate spread (Pagano, 1993) and also leads to a higher
tendency to ration credit (Guzman, 2000), resulting in sub-optimal credit market
performance. This conclusion is without regard to the fact that some level of bank-
ing market concentration may help to reduce the degree of information asymmetry
in credit markets. In fact, Petersen & Rajan (1995) suggest that banking market
concentration encourages long term relationships in banking, due to the potential
for intertemporal surplus sharing. These relationships help banks acquire important
credit information about borrowers, suggesting that information asymmetry is less
of a problem in more concentrated or less competitive banking markets.
Another reason to suggest that credit information sharing may not be as ben-
eficial in concentrated markets as in competitive markets is given by Cetorelli &
Peretto (2000). They show that banks in concentrated markets are more likely to
screen borrowers and lend e ciently than banks in competitive markets. This view
is consistent with Marquez (2002). They argue that competitive banking markets
have a small pool of borrowers per bank, suggesting that these markets have more
dispersed credit information. Hence, the risk of adverse selection is much higher in
competitive banking markets. In contrast, banks in consolidated banking markets
have a large pool of borrowers and face a relatively low risk of adverse selection.
The points highlighted above suggest that, whilst credit information sharing may
a↵ect bank lending, banking market concentration may play a crucial role. The
information needs of banks in highly concentrated banking markets should be very
di↵erent from banks in less concentrated markets. Thus, it is important for empirical
works to address this concern.
2.2. Empirical evidence
The relationship between credit information sharing and credit market perfor-
mance has attracted some empirical attention, starting with Jappelli & Pagano
(2002), who, in a cross-sectional study of 43 countries, show that credit informa-
tion sharing increases bank lending to the private sector (as a ratio of gross domestic
product). Given that the quality of institutional factors such as legal enforcement,
which protects the rights of creditors, could possibly substitute for the availability
of credit information, they further control for these factors and find e↵ect of infor-
mation sharing is stronger in poorer countries. Behr & Sonnekalb (2012), however,
show that, whilst credit information sharing reduces default rates, it has no e↵ect
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on the probability of a loan application’s approval. This suggests that the channels
through which credit information sharing impacts on overall lending need further
attention.
Using firm-level data, Love & Mylenko (2003) show that firms’ perceived financial
constraint is lower and the share of bank financing higher in countries where private
credit bureaus exist. The e↵ect of public credit registries, however, is found to be
statistically insignificant. Their findings further suggest that small and medium-
sized firms have improved access to bank financing in the presence of private credit
bureaus. Similar evidence is presented in Brown et al. (2009). Using a sample of
24 transitions countries in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, they find
that credit information sharing improves firms’ access to credit and reduces the cost
of borrowing. Again, their findings suggest that credit information may be more
beneficial to informationally asymmetric firms and firms in countries with weak legal
enforcement.
Given the theoretical prediction that credit information is relatively less asym-
metric in highly concentrated banking markets, one would equally expect credit infor-
mation sharing to have less e↵ect on lending in more concentrated banking markets.
Empirical evidence is, however, lacking in this respect. The informational advantage
of concentrated banking markets is empirically weak given that some studies (e.g.,
Black & Strahan, 2002; Hannan, 1991) suggest a negative e↵ect of concentration
on financing, whilst others show a positive e↵ect (e.g., Cetorelli & Gambera, 2001;
Petersen & Rajan, 1995). It is worth noting, however, that the negative e↵ect of
concentration on access to finance is ameliorated by the presence of credit informa-
tion sharing. This is empirically shown by Beck et al. (2004). This evidence suggests
some degree of interaction between credit information sharing and banking market
concentration. Nevertheless, it does not provide evidence on the direct e↵ect of credit
information sharing and how banking market concentration moderates it. Related
evidence presented in Barth et al. (2009) suggest that, both information sharing and
banking market competition reduce corruption in bank lending, and that the e↵ect
of competition is mitigated by credit information sharing. This current paper seeks
to investigate the direct and the interaction e↵ects of credit information sharing on
bank lending. Also, by using bank-level data, which provides supply side evidence,
this paper adds a new dimension to the literature.
To conclude this section, it is emphasised that, even though micro-level evi-
dence provides an additional dimension to the literature, as it helps to control for
heterogeneity at the firm level, the literature could be extended by analysing the
relationship between credit information sharing and the supply of credit at the bank
level. Besides providing supply side evidence, this approach helps to control for
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(unobserved) heterogeneity of banks, which otherwise could be confounded. Addi-
tionally, even though theory predicts that the information needs of banks may be less
of a problem in concentrated banking markets, the existing empirical studies have
not considered the possibility that the e↵ect of credit information sharing may be
moderated by banking market concentration. This study seeks to fill in these gaps.
3. Research hypotheses
Based on the theoretical predictions and empirical evidence about credit infor-
mation sharing and credit market outcomes, two main testable hypotheses are for-
mulated.
Given that the problems that credit information sharing is meant to address are
endemic in the African banking market, one could expect its e↵ect to be particu-
larly high in the region. For instance, high levels of adverse selection problems are
reflected in the record levels of default in African banking markets. Also, moral
hazard problems should be particularly high given the weak legal enforcement in the
region. Hence, by reducing the risk of adverse selection (Pagano & Jappelli, 1993)
and moral hazard (Bennardo et al., 2010; Padilla & Pagano, 2000; Pagano & Jap-
pelli, 1993), credit information sharing is expected to reduce default rates and the
cost of borrowing and, at the same time, reduce credit rationing. This leads to the
first hypothesis:
H1: Credit information sharing has a positive e↵ect on bank lending in African bank-
ing markets.
Also, given that banks in concentrated markets face relatively less information
asymmetries due to the incentives of long term customer relations (Petersen & Ra-
jan, 1995), more e cient screening (Cetorelli & Peretto, 2000) and less dispersed
credit information (Marquez, 2002), credit information sharing is expected to have
less e↵ect on lending in concentrated banking markets. Hence, a second hypothesis
is formulated as follows:
H2: The e↵ect of credit information sharing on bank lending decreases with banking
market concentration.
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4. Empirical model
In this section, empirical models are formulated to help address the main ques-
tions raised in this paper. In order to explore variations in bank lending over time,
the paper adopts a panel data approach, which permits bank and country level vari-
ables to vary over time. Also, to allow for the possibility that bank lending may
not have been observed under long-run equilibrium for any given year, a dynamic
estimation approach is adopted to accommodate the possibility of partial adjustment
towards equilibrium. Thus, the following baseline model is formulated:
Lendingi,t = ↵ +  1Lendingi,t 1 +  2Infoj,t +  3CRj,t +  0Xi,t
+ ⇠0Zj,t + "i,t, (1)
where i 2 j indicates the ith bank in country j; Lending is the credit market perfor-
mance measure; CR is the concentration ratio of banking markets in each country;
Info is the information sharing index, which is alternately the credit information
sharing dummy and the depth of credit information index; X is a set of other bank
control variables; whilst Z represents a set of macroeconomic variables and gover-
nance indicators; ↵,  ,   and ⇠ are parameters; and "it is a composite error term
including bank-fixed e↵ects:
"i,t = µi + ⌫i,t
where µi is bank-fixed e↵ects and ⌫i,t, by assumption, is an independently and identi-
cally distributed component with zero mean and variance  2v . The detailed definition
and description of all variables are given in Section 5. Growth and profitability are
treated as predetermined, rather than as strictly exogenous variables, due to possible
feedback from past shocks.
Equation (1) permits a direct test of the first research hypothesis. In order to
test the second research hypothesis, equation (1) is modified to include an interaction
term between information sharing index and concentration ratio as follows:
Lendingi,t = ↵ +  1Lendingi,t 1 +  2Infoj,t +  3CRj,t +  4Infoj,t ⇥ CRj,t
+  0Xi,t + ⇠0Zj,t + "i,t (2)
The total (or marginal) e↵ect of credit information is obtained by di↵erentiating
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equation (1) with respect to the information sharing variable, as follows:
@ (Lendingi,t)
@ (Infoi,t)
=  2 +  4CRj,t (3)
Here,  4 reflects the extent to which banking market concentration moderates the
e↵ect of credit information sharing.
Due to the presence of the interaction term, the e↵ect of banking market concen-
tration on bank lending also needs to be interpreted with caution; it is now given
by
@ (Lendingi,t)
@ (CRi,t)
=  3 +  4Infoj,t (4)
The estimation of equations (1) and (2) requires special attention to avoid endo-
geneity problems. First, the bank-fixed e↵ects need to be wiped out. This can be
achieved by first-di↵erencing the equations. Next, the lagged dependent variables,
by construction, are correlated with the di↵erenced error terms. To circumvent this
setback, Arellano & Bond (1991) propose the di↵erence GMM estimator, which uses
the lagged levels of the endogenous variables as instruments in the di↵erenced equa-
tion. Assuming that the original error term, "i,t, is serially uncorrelated, and that
the explanatory variables are weakly exogenous, the following moment conditions
apply:
E (yi,t s "i,t) = 0; fors   2; t = 3, ..., T (5)
E (Xi,t s "i,t) = 0; fors   2; t = 3, ..., T. (6)
where X represents all the explanatory variables other than lagged lending.
As shown in Alonso-Borrego & Arellano (1999) and Blundell & Bond (1998),
lagged levels of the explanatory variables can perform poorly as instruments for their
first-di↵erences, due possibly to persistence or measurement error. Hence, to improve
e ciency, the equation in levels may be combined with the di↵erenced equation to
obtain a system of equations (Arellano & Bover, 1995; Blundell & Bond, 1998). In the
system GMM, the variables in levels have as instruments the lagged first-di↵erence of
the corresponding variables. Additional orthogonality restrictions apply as follows2:
2Lagged di↵erences other that the most recent ones are not used because they result in redundant
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E ( yi,t s"i,t) = 0; fors = 1. (7)
E ( Xi,t s"i,t) = 0; fors = 1. (8)
Theoretically, the first-di↵erenced equation may have first order serial correlation.
Second order serial correlation in the di↵erenced equation is, however, a cause for
concern as it indicates possible first order serial correlation in the levels equation
(Roodman, 2009). Hence, a formal test for this is performed. Next, a Hansen test of
over-identifying restrictions is employed to test the validity of the over-identification
restrictions. Finally, standard errors are corrected for finite sample bias using the
two-step covariance matrix proposed by Windmeijer (2005).
5. Data
To estimate the specified models in Section 4, bank-level data consisting of 471
African banks over the period 2004 to 2009 is obtained from the BankScope database,
which accounts for about 90% of all banks in each country.3 The sample consists of
all active banks with three or more years of consecutive observations.4 Banks with
negative values of equity and for which the dependent variable, the ratio of loans to
total assets, is missing are dropped. Country-year observations with less than three
banks are also excluded from the sample. The final sample contains about 2000
bank-year observations.
Credit information sharing data and macroeconomic data are obtained from the
World Bank (2011) World Development Indicators (WDI). Governance data, in-
cluding rule of law, regulatory quality and control of corruption, are obtained from
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), details of which are discussed in Kaufmann
et al. (2011).
moment conditions (see Arellano & Bover, 1995).
3For a detailed sample breakdown see Table A.1. The sample of banks is from 35 African
countries. Tunisia, Kenya, Egypt and Tanzania have relatively high number of banks in the sample.
However, this is a fair representation of the population of banks in each country.
4The subsequent results, however, do not significantly change when non-active banks are included
in the sample.
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5.1. Bank-specific Variables
The models to be estimated (equations (1) and (2)) employ the bank-specific
variables described and motivated in this subsection. The choice of variables and
proxies is guided by the literature. Credit market performance is measured as the
ratio of loans to total assets, as in Andrianova et al. (2011), Chen & Liu (2013)
Demetriades & Fielding (2012), Kaufman (1966) and Weill (2011), as it captures
banks’ tendency to grant loans. Following the literature, the paper controls for other
bank level variables, particularly profitability, deposit mix and the government share
in ownership of each bank.
Following Demetriades & Fielding (2012) the paper controls bank profitability
and the ownership share of government in each bank. Profitability is measured
as net income as a percentage of total assets; it controls for managerial e ciency.
Government share is the percentage of ownership share in each bank that is held
by the government. This variable controls for the credit stabilisation function of
government-owned banks (e.g., Micco & Panizza, 2006) and the possible distortion
of optimal market outcomes (e.g., Cecchetti & Krause, 2001; Barth et al., 2001;
La Porta et al., 2002).
Also in order to control for the extent to which banks are reliant on demand
deposits the paper controls for deposit mix as in Chen & Liu (2013), Heggestad &
Mingo (1976) and Micco et al. (2007). Banks with a very high deposit mix may be
less competitive at generating time and savings deposits (Heggestad & Mingo, 1976).
Deposit mix is measured as the percentage of demand deposits to total deposits. This
variable controls for the extent to which banks are reliant on demand deposits; banks
with a very high deposit mix may be less competitive at generating time and savings
deposits (Heggestad & Mingo, 1976).
5.2. Information sharing variables
Credit information sharing is measured in either of the following ways: first, as a
dummy variable equal to one for countries (and years) in which either a public credit
registry or private credit bureau operates.5 The second measure of credit information
sharing utilises a credit information index, which goes beyond the mere existence of
credit registries and examines the depth of information sharing.
The depth of information index ranges from zero to six (0-6), where higher figures
indicate the availability of more credit information to help make lending decisions.
The index is zero if the credit registry or private credit bureau is non-operational or its
5As explained in World Banks “Doing Business” database, these countries are those that have
zero percentage coverage of adult population.
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coverage is below 1% of the adult population. Otherwise, one point is given for each
of the following features: public credit registry or private credit bureau distributes
data on both firms and individuals; both positive and negative credit information are
shared; data from retailers, utility companies and financial institutions are shared; at
least two years of historical data are distributed; data are collected and distributed
for loan amounts below 1% of income per capita; and the law permits borrowers to
inspect their own data.
5.3. Banking market concentration
Banking market concentration is mainly the three-bank concentration ratio, mea-
sured as the share of assets of the largest three banks as a percentage of total banking
assets. This measure of concentration is preferred over other alternative measures
(five-bank concentration ratio and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index). This is because
the sample size changes over the sample period, which could result in measurement
bias when the number of banks goes beyond the top three banks (see, Beck et al.,
2006). For robustness checks, however, the findings are verified against the five-
bank concentration ratio and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) as alternative
concentration measures.
5.4. Macroeconomic and governance variables
To ensure that the relationship between lending and credit information sharing is
not driven by some variations in the macroeconomic and institutional environment,
the paper controls for macroeconomic and institutional variables. Following Altunbas
et al. (2009), Andrianova et al. (2011) and Dinc (2005), the growth rate of gross
domestic product (GDP), measured as the annual percentage change in real GDP
is controlled for. GDP growth rate controls for possible changes in the demand
for credit within a country (Altunbas et al., 2009) and the possible variations in the
probability of adverse selection and moral hazards across business cycles (Andrianova
et al., 2011).
Also, following the literature (Barth et al., 2009; Dinc, 2005; Love & Mylenko,
2003; Weill, 2011), inflation rate, measured as the annual percentage change in the
GDP deflator, is controlled. Inflation rate controls for uncertainty in credit market.
As a final step, consistent with the literature (e.g., Andrianova et al., 2011; Deme-
triades & Fielding, 2012; Jappelli & Pagano, 2002), governance indicators of rule of
law, regulatory quality and control of corruption are controlled for. Rule of law is
an index that captures “the perceptions of the extent to which agents have confi-
dence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract
enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of
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crime and violence” (Kaufmann et al., 2011, p. 223). This index ranges from -0.25
to 0.25. The world average of this index for the base year is 0. Hence, a positive
value of the index for any country suggests that country’s performance is above the
world average. Thus, higher values of the index suggest higher regard for the rule of
law.
Regulatory quality is an index that proxies for the “the perceptions of the ability
of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that
permit and promote private sector development” (Kaufmann et al., 2011, p. 223).
Again, the world average for this index is 0, and higher values suggest better regula-
tory environments. Control of corruption is an index “that captures the perceptions
of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty
and grand forms of corruption, as well as ‘capture’ by elites and private interests”
(Kaufmann et al., 2011, p. 223). As is the case with the first two indices, the world
average is 0, and higher values suggest firmer controls on corruption.
5.5. Summary statistic
Descriptive statistics for the main variables are presented in Table 1. The average
of lending is about 49.4%, indicating that bank credit is less than 50% of bank assets.
By international standards, this is relatively low.6 On average, profitability of African
banks as a percentage of assets is about 1.7%.7 Deposit mix averages about 85.8%,
indicating that African banks are funded predominantly by demand deposits. This
suggests that most banks face higher funding risks. In terms of ownership, on average,
about 11.3% of total banking assets in Africa are owned by governments. All the
above-mentioned variables exhibit a significant amount of variations, as indicated by
their large standard deviations.
The three-bank concentration ratio is 0.584, suggesting that, on average, the top
three banks in each country control about 58% of total banking assets.8 It is also
clear that a significant number of countries have information sharing institutions, but
the credit information sharing has substantially low depth, as shown by an average
6The average ratio of lending to assets reported in this study is relatively low compared to those
reported in related studies. For example, Dinc (2005) and Weill (2008) record an international
average of 54% and 56% respectively.
7The average profitability looks high by international standard, a result attributable mainly to
a few countries such as Botswana, South Africa, Namibia, Morocco, Sudan, Nigeria, Sierra Leone,
Ghana, Uganda, Ethiopia and Kenya.
8This ratio reflects the e↵ects of several years of significant reforms across African banking
markets, which have seen significant increase in the number of banks in these countries in recent
times (Allen et al., 2011; Fosu, 2013; Senbet & Otchere, 2006).
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depth of credit information index of 2.
The mean values of the governance variables are all negative, indicating that
the quality of governance in Africa is substantially below the world average. These
variables also exhibit substantial variations, as indicated by their standard deviations.
Table 2 presents the correlation matrix of the main variable. The alternate mea-
sures of credit information sharing are strongly correlated, but this poses no concern
as they do not enter the regression at the same time. Likewise, the governance in-
dicators enter the regression one at a time as they exhibit a very strong correlation
with one another. With regard to the remaining variables, there is no evidence of
multicollinearity.
6. Empirical results
This section presents the estimation results for equations (1) and (2), which
permit us to test the main research hypotheses. In order to ascertain the sensitivity
of the main results, a series of robustness checks is also carried out.
6.1. Main results
The main results of this paper are presented in Tables 3 and 5. The corresponding
marginal e↵ect analyses which help substantiate the test of the research hypothesis
are presented in Tables 4 and 6, respectively. In Table 3, the information sharing
dummy variable is used as a measure of the availability of credit information through
information sharing, whilst in Table 5 the depth of credit information index is used.
In all the results presented here and in subsequent sections, the maximum lag de-
pendent variables are restricted to one in order to restrain the number of moment
conditions. The lag dependent variables are positive and significant; the Hansen
test p-values are all well above 0.1, justifying the validity of the over-identification
restriction; and, finally, the absence of second-order serial correlation is not rejected.
Thus, the use of a dynamic model is appropriate.
6.1.1. Results using the credit information sharing dummy
The results presented in Table 3 show that credit information increases bank
lending in developing countries. Starting from Model 1 (relating to equation (1)
without controlling governance), it can be seen that the coe cient on Information
sharing is positive and highly significant. It suggests that banks in countries that
share credit information lend approximately 4.72% more than their counterparts in
countries without credit information sharing. In other words, countries that switch to
an information sharing regime can expect to increase bank lending by about 4.72%.
This finding provides support for the first research hypothesis (Hypothesis 1). The
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finding here is largely consistent with macro- and firm-level evidence provided in
Brown et al. (2009), Djankov et al. (2007), Jappelli & Pagano (2002) and Love &
Mylenko (2003).
As regards the control variables, the results in Model 1 of Table 3 also suggest that
banking market concentration, generally, significantly impedes bank lending. This
evidence is broadly consistent with Black & Strahan (2002) and Hannan (1991).
Also, profitable banks lend more than less profitable banks. This may be attributed
to the notion that more profitable banks have more e cient management. Consistent
with Weill (2011), it is also seen that banks that depend more on demand deposits
lend less. It is possible that, being less competitive in generating funds from other
sources increases bank risk aversion. The e↵ect of government share in the ownership
of banks does not significantly a↵ect bank lending. Whilst its coe cient is negative,
it is statistically insignificant. This could possibly be because government banks
are becoming less active in credit markets in developing countries as many of these
countries experience high growth rates (see Micco & Panizza, 2006). Growth rate of
GDP is positively associated with more bank lending. This can be attributed to the
possibility that higher growth rate induces confidence in credit markets. High rates
of inflation, on the other hand, decrease bank lending.
Model 2 of Table 3 shows the results for the estimation involving the interaction
term between information sharing and concentration (i.e., equation (2)). The con-
trol variables retain their signs and significance. Banking market concentration is
significant only through its interaction with information sharing. Thus, the e↵ect of
concentration on bank lending is insignificant when there is no credit information
sharing, but significantly negative when credit information is shared. Impliedly, bar-
ring the information advantage of concentrated banking markets, concentration can
have a detrimental e↵ect on bank lending. Stated di↵erently, banking concentration
may be less harmful in an informationally asymmetric banking environment. This
finding is more or less inconsistent with (Beck et al., 2004).
As before, credit information sharing is seen to impact positively and signifi-
cantly on bank lending, as the coe cient on Information sharing remains positive.
However, due to the presence of the interaction term, the results need to be inter-
preted carefully. The coe cient on the interaction term, Informationsharing ⇥
Concentration, is negative and statistically significant, suggesting that the positive
e↵ect of credit information sharing is a decreasing function of banking market concen-
tration. Thus, the findings suggest that information asymmetry is less of a problem in
more concentrated banking markets, making credit information sharing less e↵ective
at increasing lending. This finding provides support for the second research hypoth-
esis (Hypothesis 2), but the detailed marginal e↵ect analysis that follows shortly will
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help corroborate this. Models 3–9 extend the analysis by controlling for governance
indicators of rule of law (Models 3–4), regulatory quality (Models 5–6) and control
of corruption (Models 7–8). The results remain unchanged, whilst the governance
indicators appear significant with the expected sign.
Evaluating the moderating e↵ect of concentration on the relationship between
credit information sharing and bank lending, Table 4 suggests that credit information
sharing can increase bank lending by between 2.60% and 5.07%, depending on the
degree of banking market concentration. Applying equation 3 to Model 2 of Table 3,
where no governance indicator is controlled for, a switch to an information sharing
regime is associated with a 5.06% increase in bank lending when the banking market
concentration is at the 25th percentile. This e↵ect decreases to 4.27% and 2.64%
when concentration is at the 50th and 75th percentiles, respectively. The marginal
e↵ect analysis yields similar results when applied to the models in which governance
indicators are controlled for (i.e., Models 4, 6, and 8), as shown in the table. In fact,
the di↵erence between the e↵ect of credit information sharing at the 25th percentile,
on the one hand, and at the 75th percentile, on the other hand, is at least 2.32%.
Hence, it can be concluded safely that the benefit of credit information sharing
decreases with banking market concentration. This evidence strengthens the support
for Hypothesis 2.
The next set of results focuses on the depth of credit information index, rather
than the mere presence of information sharing. This is an important addition in
view of the fact that the depth of information sharing di↵ers considerably across
countries.
6.1.2. Results using the depth of credit information index
Table 5 presents the results in which the depth of credit information index is
used in place of the information sharing dummy. Since the characteristics of credit
information sharing di↵er between countries and time periods, the depth of credit
information index is likely to capture more information than the information sharing
dummy variable.
The findings are consistent with those presented in Subsection 6.1.1. In Model 1 of
Table 5 it can be seen that a one-unit increase in the depth of credit information index
increases bank lending by about 0.86%. The e↵ect is highly statistically significant
(at the 1% level). Hence, switching from a regime without credit information sharing
to a regime with fully-fledged credit information sharing can increase bank lending
by up to 5.16%. The finding is consistent with the models that control for governance
indicators (Models 3, 5 and 7). This finding, again, provides support for Hypothesis
1.
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The models that incorporate the interaction term between the depth of credit
information index and banking market concentration (Models 2, 4, 6 and 8) give
similar results to those presented earlier. Again, the depth of credit information
index remains positive and statistically significant, whilst the interaction term is
significantly negative. Thus, the results further suggest that a higher depth of credit
information is associated with higher bank lending, but the increased lending may
not be by as much in concentrated banking markets as in less concentrated banking
markets. Again, this finding is robust across di↵erent model specifications. The
negative coe cients of the interaction terms also suggest that the overall e↵ect of
banking market concentration on bank lending is negative.
As in the preceding section, in order to measure the moderating e↵ect of concen-
tration on credit information sharing, the interaction term is evaluated at the 25th,
50th and 75th percentiles of concentration. Table 6 presents this marginal e↵ect
analysis. In the model that does not control for any governance indicator (Model 2
of Table 3), a one-unit increase in the depth of credit information index increases
bank lending by 0.95%, 0.656% and 0.062% at the 25th 50th and 75th percentiles,
respectively. This clearly shows that the lending-enhancing e↵ect of credit informa-
tion sharing decreases with banking market concentration, thus providing support for
Hypothesis 2. Similar results are reported for the models controlling for governance
indicators.
6.2. Robustness checks
A natural progression, at this stage, is to assess the robustness of the above
findings. In particular, the possibility of further interactions between information
sharing and governance is investigated. This is followed by addressing the possibility
of endogeneity problems. Next, the e↵ects of using alternative estimation methods,
on the one hand, and alternative measures of concentration, on the other hand, are
analysed.
6.2.1. Extensions - interactions with governance indicators
It may be argued that good quality governance may be a substitute for credit
information sharing. For instance, credit information sharing may be more useful in
banking markets with less legal enforcement (Jappelli & Pagano, 2000, 2002). Hence,
the models above are extended to include interactions with governance indicators of
the rule of law, regulatory quality and control of corruption. The results are presented
in Table 7; they are similar to those presented earlier in Subsection 6.1.
The e↵ects of governance on bank lending now need to be equally interpreted
with caution, given the presence of their interaction with information sharing. The
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models employing the information sharing dummy suggest that a one-unit (corre-
sponding to one standard deviation in the worldwide sample) increase in governance
increases bank lending by between 3.24% and 4.63% when there is no information
sharing scheme, depending on the governance indicator used. When credit informa-
tion sharing exists, the e↵ect is up to 1.86%. Similarly, when the depth of credit
information index is employed, a one-unit increase in governance will improve bank
lending by up to 3.88% when the depth of credit information index is 0. However,
at the median depth of credit information index, a one-unit increase in governance
will improve bank lending by up to 1.93%.
Table 7 shows that credit information sharing impacts positively on bank lend-
ing. The coe cients of the interaction term between the credit information sharing
and concentration (Models 1, 3 and 5) remain significantly negative. Also, the ad-
ditional interactions between credit information sharing and governance indicators
are negative and statistically significant. The findings are consistent when the depth
of credit information index is employed as the measure of information sharing. In
Models 2, 4 and 6, the depth of credit information index has a statistically signifi-
cant coe cient, whilst the interaction terms all have statistically significant negative
coe cients. Thus, whilst providing support for the findings that credit information
sharing impacts positively on bank lending and that this e↵ect decreases with con-
centration, the results further show that the benefits of credit information sharing
are less in countries with robust governance compared with countries with more lax
governance.
The marginal e↵ect analysis presented in Table 8 shows that, by holding the rule
of law at the 25th percentile, a switch to an information sharing regime will increase
bank lending by about 5.95% if concentration is at the 25th percentile, but by 3.90%
if concentration is at the 75th percentile. However, at the 75th percentile of the
rule of law, the e↵ect of information sharing will be a 3.41% and 1.36% increase in
bank lending if concentration is at the 25th and 75th percentiles, respectively. This
analysis confirms that sharing credit information can help boost bank lending, and
that the e↵ect is not as great in more concentrated banking markets as it is in less
concentrated banking markets.
6.2.2. Endogenous credit information
The next robustness check performed in this paper is in respect of possible reverse
causality between credit information sharing and bank lending. This endogeneity
problem is less likely to apply in this study since it is conducted at individual bank
level whilst credit information sharing decisions are at the country level. It is unlikely
that an individual bank’s lending decision influences the information sharing policy
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at the national level. Besides, over the sample period, majority (89%) of the countries
in the sample maintained their information sharing regime, making reverse causality
less likely.
The above notwithstanding, an attempt is made to re-estimate the model as-
suming information sharing is endogenous. The following are employed as external
instruments for the credit information variables: religious composition, ethnocentric
fractionalisation, legal origin and urbanisation.9 Urbanisation, measured as per-
centage of urban population to total population, is obtained from the World Bank
(2011).10 Ethnocentric fractionalisation, legal origin and religious compositions are
shown to be significant determinants of the establishment of information sharing
schemes (see Djankov et al., 2007), and have been used as instruments for informa-
tion sharing in recent papers (Barth et al., 2009; Houston et al., 2010). Urbanisation
has also been used in Buyukkarabacak & Valev (2012) as an instrument for informa-
tion sharing on the grounds that information travels less e↵ectively in urban areas,
making credit information sharing more likely in more urbanised countries.
Having included in the regression other variables capturing institutional settings,
the instruments may be assumed to satisfy the standard exclusion criteria. In the
first stage of the regression all the instruments significantly a↵ect credit information
sharing.11
The findings presented in Tables 9 and 10 are consistent with those presented ear-
lier. Table 9 presents the results for the credit information sharing dummy. Despite
the apparent di↵erences in the magnitudes of the coe cients, information sharing
has a significantly positive coe cient whilst the interaction term remains signifi-
cantly negative across all models. In fact, the marginal e↵ect analysis shows that,
at the 25th percentile of concentration, sharing credit information can increase bank
lending by up to 6.69%, about 1.63% higher than the case where information sharing
is treated as exogenous. At the 50th percentile, bank lending is 4.36% higher when
credit information is shared. This compares to 4.27% in the case where information
9Religious composition (the percentages of Protestant, Catholic and Muslim populations to
total population), ethnocentric fractionalisation (a measures the extent of ethnic diversity) and
legal origin (an indicator of the origin of a country’s legal system) are obtained from La Porta et al.
(1999).
10There are concerns that urbanisation may have a direct impact on lending, rendering it invalid
as an instrument. To address this issue I drop urbanisation from the instrument set, and the results
remain mostly unchanged. Additionally, when including urbanisation in the main estimations as
an explanatory variable, it enters insignificantly.
11First stage regression results are available upon request.
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sharing is treated as exogenous.12 Thus, the findings are consistent at the relevant
levels of banking market concentration.
Table 10 reports the results for the case where the depth of credit information in-
dex is treated as endogenous. The findings are highly consistent. The depth of credit
information index has a positive coe cient and it is statistically significant. The in-
teraction between this variable and concentration is significantly negative, as before.
This corroborates the earlier findings that credit information sharing increases bank
lending, and that the rise in bank lending resulting from credit information sharing
decreases with banking market concentration. In fact, marginal e↵ect analysis yields
predictions very close to those presented earlier.
6.2.3. Alternative estimation methods
The robustness of the findings to alternative estimation methods is assessed in
this section. Specifically, ordinary least square (OLS) method is employed.13 It is
noteworthy that the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable makes this alternative
estimation method ine cient. The results are presented in Tables 11 and 12. The
adjusted R2 shown in the results tables suggests that about 80% of the variations
in bank lending are explained by the explanatory variables. The lagged dependent
variable is also significant, justifying the use of a dynamic estimation method. Its
coe cients are also relatively larger in magnitude than those presented in the main
results (Tables 3 and 5).
Table 11 presents the OLS results for the models using the information sharing
dummy. The results are qualitatively similar to those obtained under the dynamic
system GMM estimation. The coe cient of information sharing is positive across all
the models. It is also significant across all models without interaction terms except
when the governance indicator is the regulatory quality. When the interaction term is
included, information sharing remains positive and significant, whilst the interaction
term is consistently negative across all models.
Highly consistent results are found when the depth of credit information index
is employed. Table 12 shows that the depth of credit information index is positive
and highly significant under all models. The interaction term is also consistently
negative and highly significant across all models. These findings lend support to the
research hypotheses.
12A separate marginal e↵ect analysis is not reported for brevity of this paper. It is available upon
request.
13Given that the information sharing variables exhibit little within variation, fixed e↵ect (within)
estimation would yield particularly inflated variance, rendering the explanatory power of the vari-
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6.2.4. Other sensitivity checks
Additional sensitivity checks are also carried out. The robustness of the find-
ings to alternative measures of competition is also assessed. First, the three-bank
concentration ratio is replaced with the five-bank concentration ratio, and, second,
the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is used as the alternative measure of con-
centration. Both yield consistent results. Third, controlling for log of total assets
and capital ratio as endogenous variables yields consistent results, but these vari-
ables appear statistically insignificant. Additionally, controlling for liquid assets as
a percentage of total assets, a proxy of risk aversion, does not change the findings.
Moreover, the sensitivity of the findings is assessed against the possibility that
some types of banks have di↵erent lending behaviour than others. As a step to assess-
ing this possibility, specialised government credit institutions and multi-lateral gov-
ernment banks, as well as investment banks are (alternatively and jointly) dropped
from the sample. The results are highly consistent with the findings reported above.
Finally, a subsample containing only countries that share credit information is
obtained, and the depth of credit information index used as the measure of credit
information. This is to help identify the true e↵ect of having a robust credit infor-
mation sharing scheme, rather than merely having such a scheme. The estimations
from this subsample yield consistent results.
7. Conclusion
Using bank-level data, the results from this paper suggest that credit information
sharing increases bank lending. Moreover, this study finds that the increases in
bank lending arising from credit information sharing decrease with banking market
concentration. The results are robust to alternative measures of credit information
sharing and banking market concentration.
Whilst banking market concentration may signal less dispersion of credit infor-
mation, the evidence in this paper suggests that this informational advantage does
not outweigh the distortion of optimal credit market performance caused by banking
market concentration. Given the wave of regulatory reforms across many banking
markets in developing countries, which have already opened up the domestic banking
markets for entry of new and foreign banks, the evidence suggests that embracing or
deepening credit information sharing will help boost financial development in these
countries.
ables weak.
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The evidence further suggests that policy makers cannot necessarily view quality
governance as a perfect substitute for ensuring better access to credit information.
Even though the benefits of credit information sharing decrease with the quality of
governance, some positive benefits still accrue from information sharing even at very
high levels of governance. This is consistent with the fact that, even in developed
countries where rule of law, for example, is robust, credit information sharing is
advanced. Hence, the findings of this paper implore developing countries to strive
to achieve e↵ective and e cient credit information sharing schemes alongside the
ongoing regulatory reforms and the promotion of quality governance.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 25th percentile 50th percentile 75th percentile N
Lending 49.389 21.218 34.252 49.377 63.745 2296
Profitability 1.748 3.469 0.716 1.630 2.835 2288
Deposit mix 85.788 22.696 84.272 94.644 99.352 2113
Government share 11.266 26.764 0 0 0.17 1949
GDP growth 5.214 3.943 3.279 5.609 6.899 1785
Inflation 8.467 6.238 3.892 7.448 11.536 2271
Concentration 0.584 0.164 0.449 0.536 0.7118 2296
Credit information sharing 0.709 0.454 0 1 1 2296
Depth of credit information 2.041 1.978 0 2 4 2296
Rule of law  0.43 0.586  0.882  0.374 0.029 2296
Regulatory quality  0.335 0.519  0.632  0.320  0.057 2296
Control of corruption  0.465 0.554  0.891  0.530  0.091 2296
This table presents the descriptive statistics for the data. The sample comprises 471 banks over the period 2004 to 2009.
Lending is the percentage of loans to total assets; Profitability is the is the percentage of net income to total assets;
Deposit mix is the percentage of demand deposits to total deposits; Government share is the percentage of ownership
share in each bank that is held by the government; GDP growth is the annual percentage change in real GDP; Inflation is
the annual percentage change in the GDP deflator; Concentration is the three-bank concentration ratio, measured as the
share of assets of the largest three banks as a percentage of total banking assets; Credit information sharing is a dummy
variable equal to one for countries (and years) in which either public credit registry or private credit bureaus operate;
Depth of credit information is an index that captures the depth of credit information. Rule of law, Regulatory quality
and Control of corruption are indicators capturing the quality of governance defined in detail in Subsection 5.4.
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Table 4: E↵ect of credit information sharing at specified levels of concentration
Concentration at: 25% 50% 75% Change between Based on
(0.449) (0.536) (0.712) 25% and 75% regression
Governance indicator:
None 5.069⇤⇤⇤ 4.265⇤⇤⇤ 2.644⇤⇤ 2.424⇤⇤ Table 3, column 2
(1.302) (1.170) (1.263) (1.151)
Rule of law 5.476⇤⇤⇤ 4.618⇤⇤⇤ 2.887⇤⇤ 2.589⇤⇤ Table 3, column 4
(1.205) (1.088) (1.258) (1.187)
Regulatory quality 5.132⇤⇤⇤ 4.363⇤⇤⇤ 2.810⇤⇤ 2.322⇤ Table 3, column 6
(1.187) (1.104) (1.355) (1.223)
Control of corruption 5.050⇤⇤⇤ 4.237⇤⇤⇤ 2.597⇤⇤ 2.453⇤⇤ Table 3,column 8
(1.226) (1.120) (1.294) (1.177)
This table shows the marginal e↵ect analysis of the results presented in Tables 3. Marginal e↵ects are
evaluated at the 25th, 50th and 75th percentiles of concentration. Standard errors are in parentheses.
⇤ Indicates significance at 10%.
⇤⇤ Indicates significance at 5%.
⇤⇤⇤ Indicates significance at 1%.
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Table 6: E↵ect of depth of credit information sharing at specified levels of concentration
Concentration at: 25% 50% 75% Change between Based on
(0.449) (0.536) (0.712) 25% and 75% regression
Governance indicator:
None 0.950⇤⇤⇤ 0.656⇤⇤⇤ 0.062 0.888⇤⇤⇤ Table 5, column 2
(0.210) (0.201) (0.322) (0.324)
Rule of law 0.900⇤⇤⇤ 0.602⇤⇤⇤ 0.002 0.898⇤⇤⇤ Table 5, column 4
(0.207) (0.199) (0.323) (0.326)
Regulatory quality 0.728⇤⇤⇤ 0.433⇤⇤  0.162 0.890⇤⇤⇤ Table 5, column 6
(0.209) (0.202) (0.330) (0.331)
Control of corruption 0.853⇤⇤⇤ 0.534⇤⇤⇤  0.111 0.962⇤⇤⇤ Table 5,column 8
(0.199) (0.192) (0.321) (0.327)
This table shows the marginal e↵ect analysis of the results presented in Table 5. Marginal e↵ects are
evaluated at the 25th, 50th and 75th percentiles of concentration. Standard errors are in parentheses.
⇤⇤ Indicates significance at 5%.
⇤⇤⇤ Indicates significance at 1%.
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Table 8: E↵ect of credit information sharing at specified levels of concentration and
governance
Concentration at: 25% 50% 75% Change between Based on
(0.449) (0.536) (0.712) 25% and 75% regression
Rule of law at:
25% (-0.882) 5.946⇤⇤⇤ 5.267⇤⇤⇤ 3.896⇤⇤ 2.051⇤ Table 7, column 1
(1.387) (1.328) (1.560) (1.217)
50% (-0.364) 4.534⇤⇤⇤ 3.855⇤⇤⇤ 2.484⇤ 2.051⇤ Table 7, column 1
(1.258) (1.141) (1.132) (1.217)
75% (0.029) 3.412⇤⇤ 2.733⇤⇤ 1.362 2.051⇤ Table 7, column 1
(1.419) (1.278) (1.363) (1.217)
Regulatory quality at:
25% (-0.631) 5.345⇤⇤⇤ 4.444⇤⇤⇤ 2.624⇤⇤ 2.722⇤⇤ Table 7, column 3
(1.225) (1.105) (1.259) (1.177)
50% (-0.320) 4.483⇤⇤⇤ 3.581⇤⇤⇤ 1.760 2.722⇤⇤ Table 7, column 3
(1.138) (1.025) (1.217) (1.177)
75% (-0.057) 3.757⇤⇤⇤⇤ 2.855⇤⇤ 1.035 2.722⇤⇤ Table 7, column 3
(1.239) (1.148) (1.344) (1.177)
Control of corruption at:
25% (-0.894) 5.320⇤⇤⇤ 4.637⇤⇤⇤ 3.260⇤⇤ 2.060⇤ Table 7, column 5
(1.274) (1.189) (1.374) (1.158)
50% (-0.521) 4.490⇤⇤⇤ 3.808⇤⇤⇤ 2.430⇤⇤ 2.060⇤ Table 7, column 5
(1.171) (1.049) (1.204) (1.158)
75% (-0.091) 3.489⇤⇤⇤ 2.800⇤⇤ 1.423 2.060⇤ Table 7, column 5
(1.313) (1.174) (1.250) (1.158)
This table shows the marginal e↵ect analysis of the results presented in Table 7. Marginal e↵ects are
evaluated at the 25th, 50th and 75th percentiles of concentration and governance indicators. Standard
errors are in parentheses.
⇤ Indicates significance at 10%.
⇤⇤ Indicates significance at 5%.
⇤⇤⇤ Indicates significance at 1%.
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Table A.1: Sample number of banks by country
Country No. of banks Country No. of banks
Algeria 16 Mauritius 13
Angola 12 Morocco 18
Benin 7 Mozambique 10
Botswana 11 Namibia 9
Burkina Faso 7 Niger 4
Cameroon 12 Nigeria 13
Congo, D.R. of 9 Senegal 10
Cote D’ivoire 9 Seychelles 5
Egypt 30 Sierra Leone 8
Ethiopia 9 South Africa 42
Gabon 5 Sudan 20
Gambia 4 Swaziland 5
Ghana 20 Tanzania 26
Kenya 34 Togo 7
Madagascar 5 Tunisia 34
Malawi 10 Uganda 16
Mali 8 Zambia 16
Mauritania 7
Source: Fitch-IBCA’s Bankscope database and own calculation.
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